

Message Text

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ACTION PM-07

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ISO-00 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 AID-20 IGA-02 MC-02 TRSE-00

L-03 OMB-01 ACDA-19 DRC-01 /111 W

----- 099531

R 280502Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7782

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO CINCPAC

JCS

CSA

CSAF

CNO

CMC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BANGKOK 16755

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, TH

SUBJ: REQUIREMENTS FOR FY 74 MAP FUNDING FOR THAILAND

REF: STATE 200320 (JOINT STATE DEFENSE MSG 092221Z OCT 73)

1. SUMMARY: THE RECENT POLITICAL CRISIS IN THAILAND WHICH LED TO THE OUSTER OF THE THANOM GOVERNMENT AND A RETURN TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 26 YEARS, HAS MADE MORE IMPERATIVE THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE GIVING SUFFICIENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT (RTG) AT LEAST TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUING MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE RTARF AT ACCEPTABLE LEVELS. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, FOR POLITICAL REASONS WE FEEL THAT A MAP GRANT AID

PROGRAM AT THE FY73 LEVEL (30-35 MILLION DOLLARS) IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN THAILAND. \$6.9 MILLION

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IN IMMEDIATE FUNDING IS URGENTLY REQUIRED. WITHOUT THIS

SUPPORT THERE WILL DEVELOP EITHER SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF THE RTARF'S POSTURE OR A POLITICALLY DANGEROUS STRUGGLE FOR BUDGETARY FUNDS BETWEEN THE SUPPORTERS OF SECURITY PROGRAMS AND OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF SANYA THAMMASSAK, WHILE APPARENTLY WILLING TO CONTINUE THAILAND'S SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. WHICH PERMITS THE U.S. USE OF DEFENSE FACILITIES IN THAILAND, HAS GIVEN TENTATIVE INDICATIONS THAT IT MAY SEEK A MORE FLEXIBLE FOREIGN POLICY. THIS ADJUSTMENT OF THAI FOREIGN POLICY TO MEET WHAT THE NEW LEADERS PERCEIVE TO BE CURRENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY REALITIES IN THE REGION WILL PROBABLY BE GRADUAL. IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION.

3. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES, PROGRAMS OR BUDGETS IN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. IN LIGHT OF THE CHARACTER OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER, WE EXPECT THE NEW LEADERS WILL DEVOTE PROPORTIONATELY LESS TIME AND ATTENTION TO DEFENSE AND MILITARY MATTERS THAN DID THEIR PREDECESSORS. THIS, OF COURSE, COULD LEAD TO PROBLEMS FOR SANYA AND HIS COLLEAGUES. ALTHOUGH THE THAI MILITARY LEADERS NO LONGER CONTROL THE RTG, THEY ARE STILL AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN ON-GOING THAI POLITICS AND A POTENTIAL DESTABILIZING ELEMENT SHOULD THEY FEEL THAT THE MILITARY IS BEING NEGLECTED BY A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

4. IN THIS SITUATION, THE U.S. HAS AN URGENT POLITICAL REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN CONTINUITY IN ITS SUPPORT TO THE RTG, INCLUDING THE CONTINUITY AND PROGRAM LEVEL OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. WE CANNOT ALLOW THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO FEEL THAT IT IS BEING GIVEN LESS CONSIDERATION IN TERMS OF ASSISTANCE THAN WE GAVE THE THANOM GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO KEEP ENOUGH MAP MATERIEL ASSISTANCE COMING INTO THAILAND TO PERMIT THE RTG TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF ITS SECURITY PROGRAMS AND TO PREVENT BREAKDOWNS IN THE MILITARY LOGISTICAL SYSTEM WHICH MIGHT TRIGGER POLITICAL REACTIONS BY THAI MILITARY LEADERS. ACCORDING TO MISSION ESTIMATES, A \$30-35 MILLION IN MAP GRANT AID IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL

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OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT TO THE THAI ARMED FORCES AND TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF SEVERAL ESSENTIAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS. AS THE RTG HAS ALREADY BEGUN ITS FY 74, IT COULD NOT EASILY MAKE THE BUDGET ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE NEEDED MATERIEL SHOULD U.S. GRANT AID FAIL TO MATERIALIZE.

5. THUS, WE FEEL THAT WERE THE PROGRAM ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF REFTEL TO MATERIALIZE AND WERE THAILAND TO RECEIVE LITTLE

OR NO GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE, IT WOULD HAVE A VERY ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE THAI DEFENSE LOGISTIC SYSTEM AND ON THE NEW THAI GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP (WHICH WOULD HAVE TO JUGGLE THE TFY 74 BUDGET TO PROVIDE FUNDS AT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL RISK). THIS, IN TURN, WOULD PROBABLY INDIRECTLY JEOPARDIZE U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN THAILAND.

6. THE MILITARY IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMS OUTLINED IN PARAS 5 AND 6 OF REF A WOULD OF COURSE BE MOST SERIOUS AS THE ONLY FUNDS OBVIOUSLY AVAILABLE FOR THAILAND WOULD BE FOR TRAINING AND POSSIBLY SOME PORTION OF THE 18 MILLION DOLLARS IDENTIFIED IN PARA 5. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE COUNTRY TEAM WOULD PREFER TO DIVERT THE FUNDS DEVOTED TO F-5 PRODUCTION FOR THAILAND TO OTHER PURPOSES AND REVIEW THE PROGRAMMED VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS WITH THE VIEW AGAIN OF DIVERTING THAILAND'S SHARE OF THE FUNDS FOR THE VEHICLE REBUILD TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS, SPECIFICALLY O AND M COSTS. THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE MIGHT WISH TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF VEHICLES PROGRAMMED FOR FY74 WOULD DEPEND ON THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS OTHERWISE AVAILABLE FROM THE 18 MILLION DOLLARS AND THE F-5 PRODUCTION. THE LONG RANGE IMPACT OF CURTAILING THESE PRODUCTION CONTRACTS IS RECOGNIZED HOWEVER.

7. THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THE FUNDING SITUATION OUTLINED IN PARAS JBBZ AND 6 OF REF A WOULD BE IN O AND M, ESPECIALLY IN REPAIR AND RETURNABLES AND SPARE PARTS, AND WOULD FURTHER COMPOUND THE EFFECT OF THE SHORTFALL OF 4 MILLION DOLLARS IN SPARE PARTS IN FY73. ALTHOUGH SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN GETTING THE RTG TO ASSUME MORE OF THE O AND M COSTS WITH THE GOAL OF REDUCING U.S. SUPPORT OF O AND M TO ZERO BY FY 80, THE RTG IS NOT AT ALL PREPARED TO ASSUME THE TOTAL COST AT THIS TIME.

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ACDA-19 DRC-01 /108 W

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R 280502Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7783
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC
JCS
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8. THE IMPACT ON THE INVESTMENT PORTION OF THAILAND'S PROGRAM WILL NOT BE AS IMMEDIATELY APPARENT AS THE IMPACT ON O AND M, BUT WILL EVENTUALLY BE APPARENT IN THE DELAY OF COMPLETION OF MANY PROJECTS AND POSSIBLE ELIMINATION OF SOME PROJECTS ENTIRELY. THESE INCLUDE MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, PROVISION OF ATTRITION REPLACEMENT ITEMS AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROJECTS.

9. SPECIFIC IMPACT

A. ARMY

(1) THE LACK OF FY74 MAP FUNDS HAS ALREADY ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR VEHICLES AND WEAPONS, THE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR O-1, OH-13S, CH-47A AND T-41B AIRCRAFT, OPERATION OF THE TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, AND OPERATION OF THE THAILAND AMMUNITION MANUFACTURING AND PRIMER PLANTS. FURTHER DELAY IN FUNDING WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO DEGRADE THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THESE AREAS.

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(2) THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RTA OPERATIONS IN THE FORTHCOMING ANNUAL COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION EXERCISE (JTX-17) MAY BE SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED DUE TO EXCESSIVE EQUIPMENT DEADLINE RATES RESULTING FROM INCREASED OPERATIONS AND INABILITY TO REQUISITION REQUIRED SPARE PARTS.

(3) SERIOUS OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS HAVE RESULTED WITHIN ALL RTA TECHNICAL SERVICE DEPARTMENTS DUE TO LACK OF FY 74 MAP FUNDS. BY RESTRICTING REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONING DURING FY 73 TO PARTS FOR DEADLINED EQUIPMENT ONLY, SOME FY 73 FUNDS HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE THUS FAR IN FY 74 FOR LIMITED REQUISITIONING. THIS AVAILABILITY WILL TERMINATE ON 31 DECEMBER, AND UNLESS FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLE, MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE RTA WILL CONTINUE TO DEGRADE. WHILE FUNDS FOR THESE OPERATIONS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY FUNDS IN PARA 10 BELOW, THE SERIOUSNESS OF HALTING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE RTA CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED.

(4) THE LACK OF FY74 FUNDS HAS PRECLUDED ACQUISITION OF CRITICALLY NEEDED AMMUNITION TO SUPPORT BASIC LOAD, WAR RESERVE, TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS THE RENOVATION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH FUNDS FOR THIS AMMUNITION ARE NOT INCLUDED IN PARAGRAPH 10 BELOW, THEIR NON-AVAILABILITY WILL SERIOUSLY LIMIT AMMUNITION SUPPORT TO THE FORTHCOMING CI EXERCISE (JTX-17), AND OTHER FUTURE OPERATIONS.

B. NAVY - IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE A SERIOUS DISRUPTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT OF THE RTN CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN THE DIRECT SUPPORT OF CI ACTIVITIES, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MINIMAL SPARE PARTS FUNDS BE PROVIDED. SUPPORT OF THE MEKONG RIVER OPERATIONS UNIT (MROU) PRESENTLY PATROLLING THE MEKONG RIVER WILL BE SEVERELY IMPAIRED, WITH A PRONOUNCED DROP IN OPERATIONAL STATUS, UNLESS FUNDS ARE PROVIDED FOR ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. THE FIRM U.S. COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE FOR TRANSFER COSTS FOR THE COST-SHARED PF, KHIRIRAT, MAKES IT ESSENTIAL THAT FUNDS FOR THE TRANSPORT, ACCOMMODATION, AND TRAINING OF THE KHIRIRAT'S CREW BE PROVIDED. LACK OF FULL FUNDING WILL SERIOUSLY IMPAIR AND DISRUPT THE CREW TRAINING PHASES AND RADICALLY AFFECT THE TIMELY AND EFFICIENT DELIVERY OF KHIRIRAT TO THE RTN.

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C. MARINES - THE ROYAL THAI MARINE CORPS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE DIRECT SUPPORT OF CI OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THAILAND CONTINUES TO INFLICT A DRAIN UPON ITS ALREADY LIMITED COMBAT POSTURE. MINIMAL DOLLARS MUST BE PROVIDED IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ROLLING STOCK AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT OF MARINE RIFLEMEN. A SHORTAGE OF ESSENTIAL SPARE PARTS OR EQUIPMENT WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MARINE OPERATIONAL GROUND FORCES.

D. AIR FORCE - THE PRESENT LACK OF FUNDS HAS ALREADY AFFECTED THE A-37A, AU-23A, C-123K AND THE UH-1H AIRCRAFT. IF FUNDING IS DELAYED PAST NOVEMBER, THE C-123K AND UH-1H WILL START TO BE GROUNDED FOR LACK OF SPARES/REPAIR PARTS. THIS SITUATION AROSE LAST YEAR WITH THE UH-1H FLEET. A CLIMB IN NORS RATE HAS BEGUN (2PERCENT TO 4PERCENT) SIMILAR TO FY73 WHEN FUNDS WERE DELAYED. STARTING IN OCTOBER 1972, NORS RATES CLIMBED ON SOME SYSTEMS TO 26PERCENT AND REMAINED THERE UNTIL MAY 1973 WHEN STOCKS WERE RETURNED TO NORMAL. A SIMILAR "DELAYED" NORS CLIMB CAN BE EXPECTED AGAIN IN 1974.

10. WE NEED TO FUND THE FOLLOWING \$6.9 MILLION IMMEDIATELY SO THAT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS DO NOT COME TO A COMPLETE STANDSTILL. THESE FUNDS DO NOT IN ANY WAY PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE OPERATIONS, NOR ELIMINATE THE FUNDING REQUIREMENTS INCLUDED IN THE CRA REQUEST CONTAINED IN MACTHAI 070745Z SEP

73.

A. RTA

87 AUTOMTO SUPP & EQ. PTS. TO SUPPORT GENERAL/ SPECIFIC
PURPOSE AND TRACK VEHICLES IN RTA INVENTORY \$1,522,097

XY18 ACFT COMP, PARTS, ACCSRYS TO SUPPORT RTA AVIATION
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 317,397

XX93 PRIMARY BATTERIES FOR OPERATION OF ON-HAND ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT IN RTA INVENTORY 150,735

XY26 AMMO RAW MATERIALS FOR CAL. 30, 7.62MM, AND 5.56MM AMMO
PRODUCED BY RTA 2,421,612

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XY31 OTHER POL LUBRICANTS/HYDRAULICS FOR RTA THAILAND
AMMUNITION MANUFACTURING PLANT (TAMP) 10,498

XY25 CHEMICALS FOR USE IN THE MANUFACTURE OF EXPLOSIVE PRIMER
PRODUCED BY RTA ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT PRIME PLANT 9,281

XY30 INDUSTRIAL SUPP, & MAT. TO SUPPORT RTA THAILAND
AMMUNITION MANUFACTURNING PLANT (TAMP) 6,426

XX82 WEAPON SPARE PARTS 88,214

XX83 OTHER SUPPORT EQ. REPAIR PARTS FOR GNERAL SUPPORT OF
VARIOUS AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS IN THE RTA INVENTORY 17,861

TOTAL \$4,544,121

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INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ISO-00 SS-20 NSC-10 CIAE-00 INR-10

NSAE-00 RSC-01 AID-20 MC-02 IGA-02 TRSE-00 L-03 OMB-01

DRC-01 ACDA-19 /108 W

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R 280502Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

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INFO CINCPAC

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B. RTN

XA00 COMMUNICATION EQ. SPARE PARTS TO SUPPORT SEA/SHORE
COMM SYSTEM 50,000

XX68 A/C COMP. PARTS TO SUPPORT ASW, GULF PATROL/SURVEIL-
LANCE A/C. 60,000

AG58 A/C COMP. PARTS TO SUPPORT O1A A/C FOR CI OPS. 6,000

XX69 SHIP SUPP PARTS, COMP TO SUPPORT FLEET OPS, MROU/
GULF PATROLS 80,000

XX70 WEAPON SPARE PARTS FOR SHIPBOARD WEAPONS REPAIR/MAIN-
TENANCE 10,000

ES30 INDUSTRIAL SUPP & MATL FOR REPAIR/MAINTENANCE OF SHIP-
BOARD EQPT. 4,000

XZ68 AUTOMTV SUPPLY & EQP PARTS TO SUPPORT GENERAL PURPOSE
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VEHICLES AND SHIPBOARD ENGINES 1,000

ER00 SHIP TRANSFER COSTS-HTMS KHIRIRAT TRANSFER CREWS 198,000

TOTAL 409,000

C. RTMC

XY80 OTHER HAND AND MEASNG TOOLS FOR REPAIR/CALIBRATION
OF COMBAT EQPT 2,000

XY90 COMMUNICATIONS EQPT SPARE PARTS TO MAINTAIN COMBAT COMM
EQPT. 20,000

XY82 PRIMARY BATTERIES FOR OPERATIONS OF ELECTRONIC
IN RTMC INVENTORY 10,000

XY91 WEAPONS SPARE PARTS FOR REPAIR/MAINTENANCE OF COMBAT
WEAPONS 15,000

XY89 OTHER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT-REPAIR PARTS FOR SAFETY EQPT.
AND GENERAL SUPPORT OF VARIOUS AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS IN
RTMC 8,000

XY83 CLOTHING, INDV EQP - COMBAT DQPT/MATL FOR RTMC PERS
FROM USA SOURCES 5,000

ER19 CLOTHING, INDIV EQPT - SAFETY HELMETS & LIFE
VESTS FOR LTV CREWS 2,000

AU69 OTHER GENERAL SUPPLIES - TO PROVIDE COLLATERAL EQPT
FOR VAR ENGINEER MAINTENANCE SHOP DEFICIENCIES 3,000

XY93 AUTOMTV SUPPL & EQP PTS TO SUPPORT RTMC GENERAL PURPOSE
AND TRACK VEHICLES FROM USA SOURCES 25,000

ER20 AUTOMTV SUPPLY & EQP PTS TO SUPPORT RTMC GENERAL PURPOSE
AND TRACK VEHICLES FROM USN SOURCES 10,000

TOTAL 100,000

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D. RTAF

ER63 REPAIR & RETURN (ARMY) UH-1H AIRCRAFT PARTS REPAIR 100,000

ET33 REPAIR & RETURN (NAVY) H-34D PARTS REPAIR 70,000

ER21 REPAIR & RETURN (ARMY) O-1/H-34C PARTS REPAIR 90,000

EY06 REPAIR & RETURN (AF) AU-23 PARTS REPAIR 32,000

XX22 AC SPARE PARTS (AF) A-37/F-5/T-28/C-123/C-47/AU-23/
T-41/T-37 652,644

ER65 AC SPARE PARTS (ARMY) UH-1H 575,321

EP63 AC SPARE PARTS (ARMY) O-1/H-34C 176,850

EQ02 AC SPARE PARTS (NAVY) UH-34D 169,050

TOTAL \$1,865,865
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